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Summary
Autonomous Vehicle (AV) technology promises to dramatically reduce deaths and economic losses from
crashes caused by human error, increase mobility for those with disabilities, and revolutionize the auto
industry. Yet legislation to facilitate oversight of the development and deployment of AVs is stalling in
Congress. Professor John Paul MacDuffie offers a primer on AV technology policy, and discusses strategies for
addressing safety and other public concerns while still facilitating AV innovation in the private sector.
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The Policy Trajectories of 
Autonomous Vehicles
John Paul MacDuffie, PhD
In March, news broke that a self-driving car belonging to Uber accidentally struck 
and killed a pedestrian in Arizona.
It was the first non-passenger death caused by an 
autonomous vehicle (AV) in the United States. Two 
years earlier, in May 2016, Tesla made headlines when 
one of its cars with automated capabilities collided 
with a truck on a Florida highway while in “Autopi-
lot” mode, killing the driver who had not responded 
to the car’s sensors beckoning him to reassume full 
control of the driving task. That incident will forever 
be remembered as the first “self-driving” car death.1 
Despite the daily tragedies that unfold across the 
U.S., which witnessed 37,461 driving-related deaths 
in 2016, stories like these become breaking news 
because of their intrigue.2 A future with self-driving 
cars dominating the streets and highways of America 
could mean far fewer driving-related deaths, and it’s 
a future sought by government (at all levels), industry, 
and many of the potential users of these vehicles. But 
when accidents inevitably occur during these years of 
technological development, many people reasonably 
ask, “What risks are we (society) willing to accept 
to advance this technology?” and “What are policy-
makers doing to mitigate these risks?” The American 
public will need to answer these questions many times 
over in the coming years, but the federal government 
has already made its preferences clear, at least for  
the moment.
SUMMARY
• As automobile crashes are tremendously costly both in terms 
of human fatalities and economic losses, and typically result 
from human error, the development of autonomous vehicles 
(AVs) has become a priority at all levels of government. 
• But the development of AVs has not been casualty-free, thus 
raising a key question: How do we best promote AV innovation 
while ensuring public safety?
• The current flexibility states enjoy in regulating AV technology 
and safety, while desirable from the perspective of supporting 
exploration and experimentation for learning purposes, has 
created an inefficient patchwork of guidance across the country.
• H.R. 3388, or the SELF-DRIVE Act, would potentially address 
this problem by enforcing a uniform standard for both technology 
and safety, while also barring states from blocking the use of 
AVs without human controls within their borders.
• As a general rule, such a paradigm of regulatory consistency 
that boosts innovation would enhance safety too, given the 
iterative nature of software and technology development.
• Beyond H.R. 3388, there are many tools available to government 
lawmakers and regulators to foster such innovation. This brief 
looks at several, including new voluntary federal policy guid-
ance, the development of a standardized AV “driver’s license 
test,” infrastructure investments, and geofencing and other 
local policy initiatives.
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In September 2016, the U.S. 
Department of Transportation 
through its National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration (NHTSA) 
published non-binding performance 
guidance in order to facilitate the 
development of AVs, offering a 
consistent regulatory regime to the 
carmakers and technology companies 
competing to bring self-driving cars 
to market.3 This document included 
a 15-point safety assessment for 
developers and model state policy. 
One year later, NHTSA updated its 
guidance,4 and in the same week, the 
U.S. House passed H.R. 3388—the 
SELF-DRIVE Act—a standard set-
ting piece of legislation that seeks to 
further advance the innovation of this 
technology.5 Both the NHTSA guid-
ance and H.R. 3388 have important 
implications, as we will discuss, but 
what these measures make immedi-
ately clear is that federal lawmakers 
and regulators are working alongside 
private industry to boost innovation 
in ways that, in other policy contexts, 
they so often do not. 
There are concerns from consumer 
advocates and other parties that these 
proposed measures put the safety of 
Americans at undue risk, and we will 
address these in turn. But there is no 
disagreement as to why the federal 
government is trying to stay ahead of 
and support this burgeoning tech-
nology. The aforementioned 37,461 
deaths in 2016 represent a 14% 
increase from 2014.6 According to 
NHTSA, “94 percent of crashes can 
be tied to a human choice or error,” 
so removing human judgment from 
the driving equation could save many 
lives.7 Not only that, AVs would allow 
increased mobility to those with dis-
abilities, revolutionize the auto indus-
try, and potentially decrease economic 
losses from crashes, which may have 
been as high as $836 billion in 2010.8
How exactly we arrive at a future 
with fully automated cars is still 
largely up for debate, and in this Issue 
Brief we will examine the inflection 
points in two sequential phases. In 
the first phase, we will address the 
benefits and costs of setting uniform 
standards—for both technology and 
safety—versus allowing for flexibility 
at the state or local levels in establish-
ing these standards. As part of that 
discussion, we will review the current 
legislation proposed in Congress and 
the actions undertaken by several 
states up to this point. In phase two, 
we assume that public support for 
developing AVs holds at least until 
2021—the year many companies have 
promised to deliver large scale rollouts 
of AVs—and highlight how federal 
lawmakers and regulators can mitigate 
near-term safety risks while facilitat-
ing innovation.
This Issue Brief also serves as a 
snapshot of the state of AVs in the 
U.S. at a crucial moment, when the 
costs (in terms of human lives) of 
developing self-driving technology are 
already materializing but before any 
binding federal legislation establishes 
firm legal parameters. Regardless of 
the fate of H.R. 3388, many policy 
challenges and opportunities lie ahead.
THE CURRENT STATE OF AV 
TECHNOLOGY
In 2017, Waymo—Google’s self-
driving car company—filed a lawsuit 
against Uber, claiming that the ride-
sharing company stole trade secrets 
when a former Waymo employee 
left to work for Uber. The case was 
intriguing, both for some of its odd 
details, but also because of the trade 
secrets at the heart of the dispute. 
Uber allegedly stole Waymo’s Lidar 
designs. Lidar is a highly specialized 
sensor that, in conjunction with cam-
eras, radar, and various other sensors, 
helps a self-driving car “see.”9 Lidar 
estimates distances (from lane mark-
ings and road edges) by using illumi-
 1  Less than a week after the recent Uber accident, a Tesla 
crash—again caused by an Autopilot error—resulted in 
the death of another driver. Executives from other com-
panies were quick to point out that such incidents are not 
representative of the AV industry as a whole, with some 
(e.g., Waymo CEO John Krafcik) going so far as to say that 
their company’s technology would have prevented these 
accidents.
 2  See https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPubli-
cation/812451.
 3  U.S. Department of Transportation (2016), Federal Auto-
mated Vehicles Policy, available at https://www.transporta-
tion.gov/AV/federal-automated-vehicles-policy-septem-
ber-2016.
 4  U.S. Department of Transportation (2017), Automated Driv-
ing Systems 2.0, available at https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/
nhtsa.dot.gov/files/documents/13069a-ads2.0_090617_
v9a_tag.pdf.
 5  H.R. 3388 available at https://www.congress.gov/115/
bills/hr3388/BILLS-115hr3388eh.pdf.
 6  The uptick in accident-related deaths, which many attri-
bute to increased instances of distracted driving, occurred 
despite the addition of more safety features to passenger 
cars, and despite the steady reduction in accident-related 
deaths in the decades prior to 2014. For data on U.S. 
accident death rates, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Motor_vehicle_fatality_rate_in_U.S._by_year.
 7  Singh, S. (2015), Critical reasons for crashes investigated 
in the National Motor Vehicle Crash Causation Survey. 
(Traffic Safety Facts Crash Stats. Report No. DOT HS 812 
115). Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration. 
 8  See https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPubli-
NOTES
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nated, invisible lasers. Unlike the other 
hardware upon which self-driving cars 
rely, Lidar is expensive to mass-pro-
duce, although great strides have been 
made in the last few years to make it 
more affordable. In February 2018, just 
five days into the trial, Uber settled out 
of court, paying Waymo $245 million 
and granting its competitor oversight 
rights for reviewing the future devel-
opment of Uber’s Lidar technology.10 
Uber initially offered to settle for a 
larger sum, but Waymo accepted the 
relatively lower settlement amount in 
exchange for the ability to monitor the 
way Uber develops Lidar on its own 
and integrates that hardware with  
its software. 
In general, AVs are the result of 
successful hardware-software integra-
tion and the melding of digital and 
automotive components. As Rahul 
Mangharam of the University of 
Pennsylvania describes, AVs continu-
ously execute a three-step process.11 
First, they must perceive all of their 
surroundings. Then, using all of the 
data gathered by the hardware, they 
must plan their routes and how they 
will navigate the changing landscape. 
For this, AVs need advanced process-
ing computers and complex software 
to guide their decision-making. The 
final step is the act of driving itself: 
they must accelerate, brake, and 
maneuver on the road without human 
intervention. All three steps pose 
problems, technologically and policy-
wise. The abruptness with which 
Waymo settled its case with Uber 
underscores the fact that hardware 
alone is not the greatest obstacle facing 
these companies. It is the algorithms 
undergirding the software in self-
driving cars that will be an especially 
significant focus of regulation in the 
coming years.
Since even a brief scan of news 
articles reveals that terms like “auto-
mated,” “autonomous,” and “self-driv-
ing” are used interchangeably—despite 
different people having different 
interpretations of each term—it is 
important for there to be a consistent 
means of describing the many levels of 
automation.12 Accordingly, NHTSA 
has adopted SAE International’s defi-
nitions for distinguishing the different 
levels of automation.13 All companies 
competing to market AVs—whether 
they are carmakers like Ford, GM, or 
Daimler, or technology companies like 
Waymo, Uber, or nuTonomy—have 
accepted these definitions as their tar-
gets, despite there being disagreements 
about whether Level 3 automation is 
even marketable (see Figure 1).
Carmakers have different beliefs 
about how ultimately to attain full 
autonomy. Toyota, for example, sub-
scribes to the idea of “human in the 
loop,” which involves human drivers 
doing most of the driving most of the 
time, but the automated system (AS) 
would kick in during a dangerous situ-
ation, like fishtailing. Tesla’s approach 
is essentially the opposite: the AS will 
handle all routine driving scenarios 
but will alert the human driver to 
retake control of the wheel (through a 
combination of bright lights, audi-
tory alerts, and physical sensors in the 
seats) whenever unpredictable circum-
stances develop. Meanwhile, Waymo 
and Ford believe Level 3 automation 
is not even feasible due to safety con-
cerns. They argue that forcing a dis-
tracted rider to assume control of the 
driving task and to monitor the road 
environment in a matter of seconds is 
too risky, especially at higher speeds. 
For this reason, Waymo cars will not 
even have steering wheels or pedals.14 
Most carmakers, however, have been 
silent on this debate, implying that 
most believe Level 3 automation is 
achievable and marketable in incre-
ments. In theory, Level 3 cars could 
reach the market faster, as they have 
fewer NHTSA regulations with which 
to contend. The first challenge for 
either Level, however, is the current 
cation/812013.
 9  Cameras are best for object recognition; radar and LIDAR are 
both good at distance; but only LIDAR (short for light direction 
and ranging) provides sharp 3-D images, accurate distance, 
and high ability to recognize objects in all light conditions. 
 10  See https://www.uber.com/newsroom/uber-waymo-
settlement/.
 11  Jason Laughlin, “Can driverless cars be safe? Grand Theft Auto 
helps Penn scientists find out,” Philly.com, December 6, 2017.
 12  Today, there are numerous examples of Level 1 and Level 
2 automation present in many cars on the market. NHTSA 
provides a concise list, which includes the following: auto-
matic emergency braking, adaptive cruise control, adaptive 
lighting, backup cameras, park assist, forward collision 
warning, lane keeping assist, lane departure warning, 
blind spot detection, and automatic crash notification (e.g., 
OnStar). Automated cars have been available to consumers 
for a long time. The lab and road tests that companies are 
conducting now, in fact, involve developing Level 3 and 
Level 4 capabilities. Audi has claimed to have even cre-
ated the first car with Level 3 automation, but they assert 
that they are unable to deploy it anywhere in the world 
because of excessive liability and the lack of governmental 
permission. See Michael Taylor, “The Level 3 Audi A8 Will 
Almost Be the Most Important Car in the World,” Forbes, 
September 10, 2017.
 13  U.S. DOT, supra note 3.
 14  Will Oremus, “The Big Problem with Self-Driving Cars,” 
Slate, September 8, 2015.
 15  For the source of Figure 2, see Gabriel Weiner and Bryant 
Walker Smith, Automated Driving: Legislative and Regulatory 
Action, available at cyberlaw.stanford.edu/wiki/index.php/
Automated_Driving:_Legislative_and_Regulatory_Action.
NOTES 
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lack of legal parameters. Which states 
or localities will even allow them on 
their roads?
PHASE 1: THE CHALLENGE 
OF LEGISLATING A UNIFORM 
STANDARD 
States have differed widely as to their 
interest in and approaches toward 
allowing the testing of Level 3 and 4 
cars on their roads. The map in Figure 
2 shows where legislation has and has 
not been passed that would authorize 
AV testing.15 Arizona (red on the 
map because state legislation failed) 
has actually been the preferred testing 
ground for companies like Waymo and 
Uber because of active promotion by 
state and local officials. This is in keep-
ing with the general presumption that 
experimentation is allowed . . . until it 
is not.
At the federal level, it is cur-
rently illegal to operate AVs without 
human controls on U.S. roads. The 
states noted in Figure 2, however, have 
passed a variety of different rules on 
everything from what can be tested 
and where, to what data AV compa-
nies are required to share with state 
officials for safety monitoring pur-
poses. And most state laws do include 
provisions requiring a human driver 
“in the loop” to help protect against 
accidents, although the recent Uber 
incident is evidence of the risks still 
inherent in road tests. States that  
have higher emissions standards, such 
as California and Massachusetts,  
also obligate AV companies to 
account for that variable in any new 
AV test designs.
The current flexibility states 
enjoy in regulating AV technology 
and safety, while desirable from the 
perspective of allowing for exploration 
and experimentation for learning pur-
poses, has created an inefficient patch-
work of guidance across the country. 
States are free to disregard NHTSA’s 
model state policy, of course, and 
many have, but in publishing these 
documents, NHTSA has reaffirmed 
its authority to oversee the changing 
auto industry.16 The non-binding guid-
 16  Specifically, NHTSA has reaffirmed its “authority to identify 
safety defects, allowing the Agency to recall vehicles or 
equipment that pose an unreasonable risk to safety even 
when there is no applicable Federal Motor Vehicle Safety 
Standard (FMVSS).”
 17  U.S. DOT, supra note 3.
 18  After a concerted lobbying effort from labor groups con-
cerned about the economic impacts on their members 
from automation, self-driving commercial trucks were not 
included in this legislation.
 19  Bryant Walker Smith, “Congress’s Automated Driving Bills 
Are Both More and Less Than They Seem,” The Center for 
Internet and Society, October 23, 2017.
 20  Sarah Light, “Autonomous Vehicle Bill Leaves Safety Gaps,” 
The Regulatory Review, September 25, 2017.
 21  S. 1885 available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-
congress/senate-bill/1885/text.
 22  Eric Kulisch, “Safety groups say Congress has given self-
driving companies too much leeway,” Automotive News, 
March 22, 2018.
 23  Historically, federal law has covered vehicles and state law 
has covered drivers – hence the confusion about what is ap-
propriate at the state level for a vehicle with no human driver. 
 24  Laughlin, supra note 10.
25 There is more than one pathway to achieving V2V com-
munication capability. Two leading contenders are DSRC 
(Dedicated Short Range Communications) technology and 
5G, the next telecom standard.
 26  See http://archive.darpa.mil/grandchallenge/.
 27  See http://fortune.com/2018/02/06/volkswagen-vw-
emissions-scandal-penalties/.
 28  For a good overview of how AVs will reshape the auto in-
surance industry, see John Cusano and Michael Costonis, 
NOTES 
FIGURE 1  THE FIVE LEVELS OF VEHICLE AUTONOMY
SAE
level Name
Execution of 
Steering and 
Acceleration 
Deceleration
Monitoring 
of Driving 
Environment
Failback 
Performance 
of Dynamic 
Driving Task
System 
Capability 
(Driving 
Modes)
Human driver monitors the driving environment
0 NoAutomation
Human
Driver
Human
Driver
Human
Driver n/a
1 DriverAssistance
Human Driver 
and system
Human
Driver
Human
Driver
Some driving 
modes
2 PartialAutomation System
Human
Driver
Human
Driver
Some driving 
modes
Automated driving system (“system”) monitors the driving environment
3 ConditionalAutomation System System
Human
Driver
Some driving 
modes
4 HighAutomation System System System
Some driving 
modes
5 FullAutomation System System System
All driving 
modes
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ance offered by NHTSA in each of the 
past two years has helped to provide 
some additional assurance to AV com-
panies that the federal government, 
absent legislation, is eager to boost 
innovation and is being careful not to 
set too many boundaries. The language 
and content of these documents were 
favorable to companies developing 
AVs, and most companies will likely 
operate within the established bounds. 
Neither document picked winners or 
losers and both presented uniform 
standards for algorithms and technol-
ogy that would be applicable across all 
states—something manufacturers will 
ultimately need. But just as impor-
tant, they upheld currently mandated 
federal safety standards and confirmed 
that states should retain their “tra-
ditional responsibilities for vehicle 
licensing and registration, traffic laws 
and enforcement, and motor vehicle 
insurance and liability regimes.”17 
Despite the NHTSA guidance, 
current legislative proposals would 
restrict the flexibility that states cur-
rently enjoy. H.R. 3388, or the SELF-
DRIVE Act, now awaiting a vote in 
the Senate after passing the House 
with unanimous support in Septem-
ber, would enforce a uniform standard 
for both technology and safety, and 
it would bar states from being able to 
block the use of AVs without human 
controls within their borders. States 
also would no longer be able to set 
rules on AV production and testing 
standards. Under this bill, self-driving 
carmakers could seek exemptions from 
existing safety standards in the first 
year for up to 25,000 cars—a measure 
meant to accelerate production. This 
number rises to 100,000 over the next 
three years.18 For their part, manu-
facturers of self-driving cars would 
be required to demonstrate that their 
AVs are at least as safe as traditional 
cars. They would have to submit 
“safety evaluation reports” to NHTSA, 
including data related to crashes and 
cybersecurity, thereby formalizing the 
earlier NHTSA guidance. But they 
“Driverless Cars Will Change Auto Insurance. Here’s How 
Insurers Can Adapt,” Harvard Business Review, December 
5, 2017.
 29  Corporate Partnership Board (2015), Automated and 
Autonomous Driving: Regulation under Uncertainty, Inter-
national Transport Forum (OECD).
NOTES 
No State Laws
Passed
Under Consideration
Failed
FIGURE 2 STATUS OF STATE LAWS ON SELF-DRIVING CARS
This map shows the status of all state laws concerning self-driving cars as of April 2018. Additionally, Arizona (2015) and Massachusetts 
(2016) issued state executive orders facilitating the testing of AVs on public roadways.
Source: Gabriel Weiner and Bryant Walker Smith, Automated Driving: Legislative and Regulatory Action, cyberlaw.stanford.edu/wiki/index.php/
Automated_Driving:_Legislative_and_Regulatory_Action
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would not need NHTSA approval 
of their unique technologies before 
bringing their cars to market.
There are various perspectives 
on how H.R. 3388 deals with safety. 
Bryant Walker Smith of the Univer-
sity of South Carolina School of Law 
generally supports the bill’s approach 
to safety, as it follows what he calls 
the “public safety case.”19 This is the 
idea that as long as “an automated 
driving developer tells the rest of us 
what they are doing, why they think it 
is reasonably safe, and why we should 
believe them,” this paradigm “encour-
ages innovation in safety assurance 
and regulation, informs regulators, 
and—if disclosure is meaningful—
helps educate the public at large.” He 
emphasizes that H.R. 3388 increases 
the obligations of AV companies rela-
tive to existing federal law. 
Sarah Light of the Wharton 
School, however, elucidates a serious 
concern shared by many consumer 
advocates. Specifically, she notes that 
in addition to preempting all state 
safety standards, H.R. 3388 actually 
mandates none at the federal level, 
leaving a significant gap in regulation. 
Acknowledging the benefits to inno-
vation and economies of scale from 
uniform technology standards, Light 
states, “[P]reempting state action 
even in the absence of federal safety 
standards fails to take into account 
the significant concerns that states 
have in protecting their citizens from 
harm.”20 She proposes that a state 
exemption for safety-setting authority 
be added to the final measure.
The bill now moves to the Senate, 
which had been considering S. 1885 
(the bipartisan AV START Act) in 
committee, to decide how to reconcile 
their preferences with H.R. 3388.21 If 
the Senate uses S. 1885 as a guide, the 
next iteration of this legislation could 
include language that preempts even 
more state functions, including some 
of the same things NHTSA recently 
affirmed in its guidance: vehicle 
registration and licensing, traffic law 
enforcement, and regulating insur-
ance. But several lawmakers are using 
Senate procedures to hold up the AV 
START Act in committee because of 
concerns about safety, cybersecurity, 
and data privacy, demanding explicit 
testing and access to micro-level data 
from AV companies.22 
Between the concerns from 
consumer safety advocates and the 
trouble faced by S. 1885, it may be 
that any Senate-passed version of 
the SELF-DRIVE Act would make 
concessions on safety authority. In 
general, however, regulatory consis-
tency across U.S. states that boosts 
innovation will enhance safety, given 
the iterative nature of software and 
technology development.
PHASE 2: NON-LEGISLATIVE 
POLICY OPPORTUNITIES FOR 
PROMOTING AV INNOVATION
The SELF-DRIVE Act is most likely 
not the final word on how regulators 
will seek to balance the facilitation 
of innovation with the ensuring of 
public and consumer safety. Even if 
it becomes law and preempts state 
safety-setting authority, states and 
municipalities will continue work-
ing to fill the regulatory gaps, as they 
still have a responsibility for protect-
ing their citizens.23 Conflicts may be 
inevitable, but they will be workable. 
Yet regardless of whether H.R. 3388, 
or a bill like it, becomes law, there are 
many opportunities for government 
lawmakers and regulators at all levels 
to foster innovation in AV technology 
without singling out automated cars 
via dedicated federal legislation. State 
exemptions and executive actions, 
new voluntary federal policy guidance, 
state and federal appropriations, and 
local policy initiatives are all tools still 
available to do this. We will discuss 
some of them here.
1. JOINING THE LEVEL 3 VS. LEVEL 4 
AUTOMATION DEBATE
In the presence of new information, 
NHTSA performance and safety 
guidance could change. Thus far, the 
U.S. government has shied away from 
making its own judgment on the 
debate over Level 3 viability. Car-
makers clearly prefer the incremental 
pathway to market offered by Level 
3 automation, but if this proves too 
risky, the voluntary federal guidance 
could shift towards directly favoring 
the Waymo approach of bypassing 
“human in the loop” and shooting for 
Level 4 automation as the next mile-
stone. The current guidance is pru-
dent given the information available, 
because should Level 3 automation 
prove to be safe and marketable, it 
would be an overreach for the govern-
ment to already be picking winners. 
This debate may end up being one of 
the most pivotal strategic, technical, 
and regulatory issues. Then again, from 
a regulatory perspective at least, it may 
not. Level-specific evaluation may be 
possible in the future (see #2, below), 
and the government may never need to 
interject itself in this industry debate.
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2. ENFORCING A SINGLE 
STANDARD FOR PERFORMANCE 
EVALUATION AND ETHICAL 
DILEMMAS 
Rahul Mangharam’s team of scien-
tists at the University of Pennsyl-
vania is developing what they call 
a “driver’s license test” for self-
driving cars. Using “mathematical 
diagnostics and simulated reality,” 
Mangharam’s test seeks to evalu-
ate the safety of AVs before they 
ever reach public roads24—a clear 
distinction from H.R. 3388’s reli-
ance on company disclosures of 
“safety evaluation reports” and its 
automatic green light to market 
cars without NHTSA pre-approval. 
He has argued that independent 
federal evaluation of technological 
performance and safety offers the 
most publicly desirable trajectory, 
and these evaluations could develop 
and improve as years go by and more 
data is gathered and processed. The 
tests could even be adjusted by auto-
mation level.
The logic behind giving cars a 
“driver’s license” is sound, especially 
as the industry progresses to higher 
levels of automation. It is anyone’s 
guess whether an independent test 
or the reliance on company disclo-
sures and data (or both) will ulti-
mately win out. But one scenario 
will almost inevitably be subject 
to a uniform standard for evalua-
tion, namely the loss-loss situation. 
Algorithms have already been (and 
will continue to be) written to deal 
with how an AV will respond to a 
scenario where damage, injury, or 
even death is unavoidable regardless 
of the car’s actions. These algorithms 
are plain attempts at solving dilem-
mas, which is clearly the domain 
of public policy when the decision 
maker is a piece of software mar-
keted to consumers. How society—
and eventually policymakers—judges 
the ethical soundness of any line of 
code is, again, still up in the air.
3. INVESTING IN INFRASTRUCTURE
There are two camps on the ques-
tion of whether significant infra-
structure investment—in the form 
of repainted lane markings, repaired 
and increased safety signage, and 
newly paved roads—would be a 
boon or a red herring to the devel-
opment of self-driving cars. These 
camps are divided on their answers 
to the question of how much  
connectivity is required to make  
AVs safe. 
In one camp are proponents of 
an older way of thinking about the 
relationships between different AVs 
on the road and between an AV 
and the road itself. They argue that 
vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) commu-
nication is essential.25 Not only will 
we need a single mandated closed 
and controlled communication 
system for AVs—something akin to 
air traffic control—but we will need 
to retrofit all vehicles on the road to 
have this capacity, according to this 
position. Furthermore, they argue 
that AV safety requires good “smart” 
infrastructure (V2I). In practice, 
it is highly unlikely there will ever 
be a single communication system, 
in large part because there will be 
too many competing algorithms. 
Besides that, car companies have 
never agreed on standards and they 
certainly do not, in most instances, 
view this issue the same way most 
technology companies do. And it is 
technology companies and small AV 
start-ups leading the other camp. 
The original breakthrough 
moment for self-driving cars was 
when a research team from Carnegie 
Mellon entered and won DARPA’s 
third and final competition of self-
driving cars in 2007 (“Urban Chal-
lenge”).26 Identifying the inherent 
software advantages that technology 
companies had in turning non-auto-
mated cars into AVs, Google entered 
the fray. Their philosophy involved 
turning an AV into an independent 
cell that would not be reliant upon 
direct communication from other 
cars or upon upgraded or smart 
infrastructure. This approach has 
greatly accelerated the development 
of AVs. 
The problem with Google’s phi-
losophy, however, is that treating AVs 
as independent cells can only move 
the technology most of the way 
to peak safety. In order to perfect 
self-driving technology, most experts 
believe V2V and/or V2I communi-
cation is still necessary. Even if the 
Google approach is 90-95% effective 
at avoiding collisions, there is a very 
small chance the American public 
will accept that outcome, given the 
public’s well-established low toler-
ance for automobile failures. There 
seems to be an opportunity here 
for states to reopen debates over 
infrastructure investment given the 
potential benefits to the future of 
self-driving cars, presupposing they 
can get the timing right. Put another 
way, the quality of America’s infra-
structure is not the red herring it 
occasionally is made out to be.
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4. LINKING AV TESTING TO LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT PRIORITIES 
In the face of all of these compet-
ing philosophies, there is one thing 
nearly every AV engineer agrees on: 
geo-fencing. That is, the practice 
of limiting the activity of AVs to 
specific geographic areas that are 
mapped in great detail (and perhaps 
have dedicated lanes for AVs) is 
the best way to advance driverless 
technology. The need for geo-fencing 
is one of the primary differences 
between Level 4 and Level 5 auto-
mation. Beyond certain geo-fenced 
areas, autonomy will not be assured 
during the years of testing. Cities 
naturally are the best-suited envi-
ronments for geo-fencing, and this 
presents interesting opportunities for 
local governments. 
Some cities such as Austin and 
Pittsburgh have had, in some cases, 
fleets of AVs on their roads for a 
few years now, despite the fact that 
their states have passed no explicit 
AV public testing rules. Cities open 
up their roads to Level 3 and Level 
4 road testing for different reasons 
and with various expectations, and 
they likely will continue to be more 
active than states in setting param-
eters in the short-term. Because they 
offer ideal testing conditions for AV 
companies, they have some leverage 
to impose demands not necessarily 
related to autonomous driving. 
Here is one hypothetical example. 
Cities could make AV testing contin-
gent upon self-driving cars meeting 
certain environmental standards. 
Ever since “Dieselgate,” there has 
been a massive uptick in public inter-
est on the topic of fostering electric 
vehicles.27 Despite the absence of 
both federal rules and any explicit 
technological linkage, cities could 
demand that a certain percentage of 
AVs be electric vehicles, at least dur-
ing the testing phase. In this man-
ner, local governments could push 
the industry towards self-driving 
cars that also happen to be greener, 
should that be a local priority.
5. EXPANDING PUBLIC INSURANCE 
AND SUPPORTING PRIVATE 
INSURANCE
Today, private automotive insurance 
provides a third-party check on the 
safety of individual drivers. But how 
does insurance work when there are 
no drivers? Assuming that, as cars 
become fully automated, liability 
gradually will shift from drivers to 
AV manufacturers, some early-stage 
ideas include insuring trips or routes 
instead of humans, insuring against 
cyber attacks, and insuring against 
product liability like “software bugs, 
memory overflow, and algorithm 
defects.”28 Precisely how this shift 
in liability will unfold is unknown, 
but it likely will involve some degree 
of public insurance, at least during 
a period of transition. As a report 
from the Corporate Partnership 
Board states, “Expanding public 
insurance and facilitating greater 
private insurance could provide 
sufficient compensation to those 
injured by an automated vehicle 
while relieving some of the pressure 
on the tort system to provide such a 
remedy.”29
Automotive insurance companies 
worry about the potential lack of 
access to data. If they are compelled 
to purchase AV performance data 
directly from manufacturers via 
private business transactions, that 
process could become exceedingly 
expensive. Private automotive insur-
ance is desirable from the govern-
ment’s perspective, so regulators may 
encounter a scenario in which they 
must mandate access to AV perfor-
mance data for insurance companies.
CONCLUSION
As this Issue Brief makes clear, 
there are ample technological, safety, 
and ethical problems for carmakers, 
technology companies, legislators, 
and regulators to address before 
2021—and beyond. Whether or not 
the U.S. Congress passes legisla-
tion mandating some uniform AV 
performance and safety standards 
in the short-term, there are plenty 
of other policy opportunities avail-
able at all levels of government for 
boosting innovation and ensuring 
public and consumer safety. Self-
driving cars may come to dominate 
the auto market in the next two 
decades and completely reshape the 
way Americans think about and use 
transportation, especially if (as many 
predict) AV companies introduce 
their vehicles through their own 
ride-hailing platforms. There may be 
a dramatic reduction in car-related 
crashes, fatalities, and economic 
losses as automation improves. And 
the economic impacts of AVs on 
jobs and the economy as a whole are 
unclear. All of these questions are the 
subjects of ongoing research that will 
need to inform how policymakers 
approach regulating the future of AV 
testing and development. 
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